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obert Solow’s (1956) neoclassical model reigns as the standard theory
of economic growth. The Solow model begins with the assumption
that capital accumulation is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
It attributes sustained growth in national income per capita to technological
progress that proceeds at a constant, exogenously given rate. Thus, it is an
exogenous growth model.
Recently, economists have developed alternatives to the Solow model that
build on Frank Knight’s (1944) earlier theory of economic growth. These
economists follow Knight by adopting an all-encompassing deﬁnition of capital
that accounts for improvements in land, human capital, and scientiﬁc knowl-
edge as well as for physical capital. Again along with Knight, they argue that
under this broad deﬁnition, capital accumulation should be subject to constant,
rather than diminishing, marginal returns. In their models, sustained growth
occurs even in the absence of exogenous technological change. Hence, these
are endogenous growth models.
This article presents versions of both the Solow model of exogenous growth
and the Knightian model of endogenous growth. In doing so, it illustrates that
the differences between these two models are more than purely technical ones;
indeed, the differences are of great relevance to contemporary policy debate
in the United States. Speciﬁcally, Section 1 shows that in the Solow model,
a change in the rate of income taxation affects the level, but not the growth
rate, of per-capita output. Section 2 demonstrates that in the Knightian model,
in contrast, changes in tax rates do inﬂuence long-run growth.
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Since the two models have such very different policy implications, deter-
mining which more accurately describes growth in the U.S. economy remains
an important task. Thus, Section 3 concludes the article with a review of the
empirical work on income taxation and economic growth.
1. THE SOLOW MODEL WITH TAXES
In the Solow model, time periods are indexed by t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,....Like many
other contemporary macroeconomic models, the Solow model considers the
behavior of a single, inﬁnitely lived representative agent. This representative
agent’s individual quantities translate into per-capita quantities when the results
are applied to understand actual economies.
The representative agent produces output Yt with capital Kt during each
period t according to a production function of the form
Yt = AKα
t . (1)
Since 0 <α<1, equation (1) indicates the presence of diminishing marginal
returns to capital accumulation: successive incremental additions to the capital
stock yield progressively smaller increases in total output. Figure 1 illustrates
this property of equation (1). It shows that the marginal return on capital, equal
to R = αAK
α−1
t , is a decreasing function of the capital stock Kt.
The representative agent saves amount St during period t in order to add
to his capital stock in period t+1. The Solow model assumes that saving St is
governed by
St = S(R − R∗), (2)
where S is an increasing function of the marginal return on capital R. Thus,
the representative agent saves more when the return on capital is higher. R∗
represents the rate of return on capital that is so low that the agent no longer
ﬁnds it worthwhile to save; when R = R∗, St = S(0) = 0.
Figure 1 traces out the dynamics generated by the interaction between the
production function (1) and the saving function (2). With the initial capital
stock given by K0, the marginal rate of return R0 exceeds R∗, so that saving
is positive. The representative agent continues to save and accumulate capital
until the marginal return has fallen to R∗. At this point, Kt = K∗, and saving
stops.
When the government imposes an income tax τ, the representative agent’s
after-tax income becomes (1 − τ)AKα
t and his after-tax marginal return on
capital becomes Rτ = (1 − τ)αAK
α−1
t . Thus, the income tax τ induces the
parallel downward shift in the marginal return schedule that is also shown in
Figure 1. Since the representative agent cares only about his after-tax return,
his saving now stops when Rτ reaches R∗. Starting from the initial capital stock
K0, capital accumulation continues only until Kt = Kτ.    
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Thus, Figure 1 reveals how the income tax affects aggregate output in the
Solow model. Since it lowers the effective marginal return on capital, the tax
weakens the representative agent’s incentives to save. Lower saving translates
into a smaller capital stock. Consequently, the level of output ultimately attained
with the tax, A(Kτ)α, is lower than the level of output A(K∗)α achieved without
the tax.
Figure 1 also shows that with or without the tax, the Solow model implies
that the marginal return on capital eventually falls to R∗, so that capital accu-
mulation and growth ultimately cease. Historically, many economists have used
this implication of the diminishing marginal returns assumption to argue that
the growth of the U.S. economy, or indeed any capitalist economy, cannot be
sustained. Alvin Hansen (1939), for example, interprets the Great Depression
of the 1930s as a symptom of a low rate of return on capital and warns that
the U.S. economy might stagnate permanently.
In light of the U.S. economy’s recovery from the Depression and its con-
tinuing expansion since then, however, Solow augments the production function
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(1) so that his model can account for sustained growth. Speciﬁcally, Solow
assumes that the parameter A increases steadily over time at the rate µ. Output




At+1 = µAt. (4)
When At increases, the representative agent produces more output with the
same capital stock. Thus, equations (3) and (4) capture the effects of constant
technological progress.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an increase in the parameter A. The govern-
ment continues to impose the tax τ. At the end of time t, the capital stock Kτ
t
has reached the level consistent with the minimum rate of return R∗; without
technological change, the economy would grow no further. When A increases
from At at time t to At+1 at time t + 1, however, the marginal return schedule
shifts upward from Rτ
t to Rτ
t+1. The marginal return rises above R∗ and capital
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accumulation begins again. The capital stock increases to Kτ
t+1. Thus, by
constantly offsetting the effects of diminishing marginal returns, the kind of
continual technological progress described by equation (4) generates sustained
growth in the Solow model.
A key assumption behind equation (4) is that µ is completely exogenous.
This assumption makes the Solow model an exogenous growth model. Although
the tax τ creates adverse effects on incentives that lead to a lower level of out-
put, it has no inﬂuence on the process of technological change that determines
the economy’s long-run rate of growth. Thus, taxes have level effects but not
growth effects in the Solow model.
The Solow model’s key implication that tax policies have level effects but
not growth effects can also be derived more rigorously with a mathematical
treatment of the model. As above, the representative agent produces output
according to the production function with exogenous technological change de-
scribed by equations (3) and (4). The government levies the ﬂat-rate income
tax τ.
The government uses its tax revenue to provide the representative agent
with a lump-sum transfer of Gt units of output at each date t. The distinction
between the ﬂat-rate tax and the lump-sum transfer must be emphasized. The
ﬂat-rate tax reduces the agent’s effective return on capital and hence weakens
his incentives to save. The agent receives the lump-sum transfer no matter how
much he saves; the payment Gt has no effect on incentives.
At each date t, the representative agent’s total income consists of his after-
tax output (1−τ)Yt and government transfer Gt. The agent divides this income
between consumption Ct and investment It; he faces the budget constraint
(1 − τ)Yt + Gt = Ct + It. (5)
From consuming Ct during period t, the representative agent derives utility





where 0 <β<1 is a factor that discounts utility in future periods relative
to utility in the current period. By investing It at time t, the agent adds to his
capital stock at time t + 1, so that
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, (7)
where δ is capital’s depreciation rate.
The representative agent maximizes the utility function (6) subject to the
constraints (3)–(5) and (7). Cass (1965) demonstrates that the solution to this
maximization problem dictates that consumption and capital eventually grow        
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at the same rate γ and the consumption-capital ratio converges to the constant
ξ. Formally,
limt→∞ Ct+1/Ct = limt→∞ Kt+1/Kt = γ (8)
and
limt→∞ Ct/Kt = ξ. (9)
Like the representative agent, the government faces a budget constraint
that requires that its receipts τYt equal its expenditures Gt in every period t:
τYt = Gt. (10)
Together, equations (3), (5), (7), and (10) imply that the economy’s aggregate
resource constraint is
AtKα
t = Yt = Ct + It = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt.( 1 1 )
That is, output equals consumption plus investment.
In light of equations (8) and (9), equation (11) determines the long-run
growth rate that is predicted by the Solow model. Dividing (11) by Kt and
taking the limit of both sides yields
limt→∞ At/K
1−α
t = ξ + γ − (1 − δ). (12)
Since the right-hand side of equation (12) is constant, this condition implies
that At and K
1−α
t must eventually grow at the same rate. Equation (4) indicates
that the growth rate of At is µ; equation (8) implies that the long-run growth
rate of K
1−α
t is γ1−α. Hence, it must be that µ = γ1−α or, equivalently, that
γ = µ1/(1−α). (13)
Equations (3) and (4) then imply that the long-run growth rate of output is
limt→∞ Yt+1/Yt = limt→∞(At+1/At)(Kt+1/Kt)α = µµα/(1−α) = µ1/(1−α). (14)
Equation (14) reveals again the Solow model’s key implication: the long-
run growth rate is ultimately determined by the rate of technological progress
µ. The tax rate τ appears nowhere in equation (14); changes in the tax rate
have no effect on long-run growth.
A numerical example illustrates the effects of taxes on growth in more
detail. With α = 0.333, µ = 1.0133, β = 0.988, and δ = 0.1, King and Rebelo
(1990) show that if each period in the Solow model represents one year, then the
model economy’s long-run annual growth rate is 2 percent, about the average
growth rate of output per capita in the twentieth-century United States.
With these parameter values, Figure 3 plots the growth rates of two Solow
economies. Both have constant tax rates, but τ = 0.20 in the ﬁrst and τ = 0.25
in the second. The economies both start with the same capital stock, set so that     
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Figure 3 Growth in the Solow and Knightian Models
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the economy with τ = 0.20 always grows at its long-run rate of 2 percent.
Thus, this numerical exercise isolates the effects of an increase in taxes from
20 to 25 percent.
The ﬁgure shows that the higher tax rate does slow the economy’s growth
in the short run. Initially, the growth rate is less than 1.54 percent under the
25 percent tax, compared to 2 percent under the 20 percent tax. Eventually,
however, the growth rates of the two economies converge, exactly as required
by equation (14). Thus, the results once again illustrate that changes in tax
policy have level effects but not growth effects in the Solow model.
2. A KNIGHTIAN MODEL WITH TAXES
Maddison (1987, Table 1, p. 650) reports that the growth rate of the U.S. econ-
omy averaged 4.2 percent annually during 1870–1913, 2.8 percent annually
during 1913–1950, 3.7 percent annually during 1950–1973, and 2.3 percent
annually during 1973–1984. As the results of the previous section demonstrate,
the Solow model attributes all changes in an economy’s long-run growth rate
to changes in its rate of exogenous technological progress. Thus, according  
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to Solow’s model, the variation in long-run growth documented by Maddison
must be due to ﬂuctuations over time in µ. Similarly, among the 92 countries
for which complete data are recorded by Summers and Heston (1991, Table
III, pp. 356–58), the average growth rate of real per-capita GDP from 1980
through 1988 ranged from 7.8 percent for China to −8.2 percent for Trinidad
and Tobago; growth in the United States during this period averaged 2.3 per-
cent. The Solow model also implies that this international variation in growth
rates must be due to cross-country differences in µ.
Solow’s model does not suggest how µ is ultimately determined, however.
Thus, the model essentially leaves unexplained the enormous variation in long-
run growth rates that is observed both within countries over time and across
countries at any given point in time. This shortcoming of the Solow model
has led economists to search for alternative models that do identify sources of
variation in long-run growth. One new line of inquiry draws on a theory of
economic growth, due to Frank Knight (1944), that predates the formulation
of the Solow model.
Knight challenges the conventional view that it is useful to organize factors
of production into the three categories of land, labor, and physical capital. Ac-
cording to this conventional view, land is permanently ﬁxed in supply. Labor
supply is slightly more variable, but is ultimately limited in the short run by
the size of the working population. Only the stock of physical capital can be
quickly and easily increased over time.
Knight points out that while land may be ﬁxed in quantity, there is no limit
to improvements that can be made in its quality. As a matter of fact, landowners
continually develop and improve their property. The productive capacity of an
economy’s land thereby increases over time, much as the productive capacity
of its physical capital stock continually expands as a result of new investment.
Similarly, argues Knight, the quantity of labor may be ﬁxed in the short run,
but the quality of the workforce is easily augmented. Just as an entrepreneur
invests today to obtain a more productive capital stock tomorrow, a worker
allocates time to education and training today so as to become more productive
tomorrow. In other words, an economy accumulates human capital as well as
physical capital.
In fact, Knight goes on to suggest that the process of technological change
is itself just the fruit of another kind of investment. Entrepreneurs and workers
search continually for new, more efﬁcient methods of production. Their research
and development efforts require resources in the present, but yield a return in
the form of increased productivity in the future.
Thus Knight, like Solow, assigns an important role to technological prog-
ress in his theory of economic growth. But while Solow assumes that techno-
logical progress occurs at an exogenously given rate, Knight views the process
as endogenous: the same incentives that induce agents to accumulate physical      
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capital drive them to search for technological and scientiﬁc advances. In light
of this distinction, Knight’s is an endogenous growth model.
Knight replaces the traditional categories of land, labor, and physical capital
with an all-encompassing deﬁnition of capital that accounts for improvements
in the quality of land, the accumulation of human capital, and the endogenous
process of technological change as well as for physical capital. Knight then
argues that the various forms of capital he identiﬁes are complements in pro-
duction. There may be diminishing returns to accumulating one type of capital
alone, but there is no tendency for their marginal product to fall as all types
are increased together. Under Knight’s broad deﬁnition of capital, therefore,
production features constant, rather than diminishing, returns.
Recent papers by Jones and Manuelli (1990), Barro (1990), King and Re-
belo (1990), and Rebelo (1991) incorporate Knight’s ideas into contemporary
models of economic growth. The simplest of these models differs from Solow’s
only in its speciﬁcation of the production function. Here, the representative
agent produces output with capital in each period t according to the linear
production function
Yt = AKt. (15)
The parameter A is once again constant in equation (15); there is no ex-
ogenous technological change. Instead, this model adopts Knight’s idea that
technological advances occur endogenously and should be accounted for in
a comprehensive deﬁnition of the capital stock Kt. Equation (15) also drops
the exponent α on capital, reﬂecting Knight’s assumption of no diminishing
returns.
The implications of Knight’s theory can be derived by considering the
properties of the production function (15) along with the saving function St =
S(R−R∗). Consider ﬁrst the case where there are no taxes. Equation (15) then
implies that the marginal return to capital is the constant A; because of the
no-diminishing-returns assumption, this return does not depend on the size of
the capital stock Kt. Since the return on capital R = A never falls to the critical
level R∗, capital accumulation continues forever.
Unlike the Solow model, therefore, this Knightian model accounts for
sustained growth in output per capita even in the absence of exogenous techno-
logical change. Recalling that Knight’s all-encompassing deﬁnition of capital
accounts for endogenous technological progress, the return R = A > R∗ pro-
vides the representative agent with an incentive to add continually to the stock
of technological knowledge. Economic growth continues as long as this incen-
tive is preserved. The Knightian model therefore contradicts Hansen’s (1939)
view that an economy will stagnate without exogenous technological change.
The ﬂat-rate income tax τ in the Knightian model shifts the marginal return
schedule down from R = A to Rτ = (1−τ)A. Sustained growth still occurs if it        
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is the case that Rτ > A. But since the tax permanently lowers the effective rate
of return, it also permanently weakens the agent’s incentive to accumulate all
types of capital. Hence, unlike the Solow model, this Knightian model predicts
that taxes affect the growth rate as well as the level of aggregate output. That
is, tax policies have both level and growth effects.
The policy implications of the Solow and Knightian models can be traced
back to the different ways in which these two models account for the process
of technological change. The Solow model depicts technological change as
a completely exogenous process; hence, tax rates do not inﬂuence long-run
growth. The Knightian model, on the other hand, treats technological change as
part of the endogenous process of capital accumulation. Just as higher tax rates
weaken the representative agent’s incentive to accumulate physical capital, they
induce him to slow down his search for more efﬁcient methods of production.
Consequently, tax rates do help determine the rate of long-run growth.
In fact, the Knightian model predicts that any economic policy that changes
incentives for the accumulation of broadly deﬁned capital will also inﬂuence
the rate of long-run growth. Since such policies differ widely over time and
across countries, this model identiﬁes potential sources of variation in long-run
growth rates that the Solow model does not.
As suggested by the analysis above, the mathematical formulation of the
Knightian model differs from that of the Solow model only in terms of the pro-
duction function. Now the representative agent maximizes the utility function
(6) subject to the budget constraint (5) and the capital accumulation equation
(7) as well as the linear production function (15). King and Rebelo (1990)
show that the solution to this maximization problem is such that consumption,
capital, and output always grow at the constant rate ω:
Ct+1/Ct = Kt+1/Kt = Yt+1/Yt = ω, (16)
where
ω = β[(1 − τ)A + (1 − δ)]. (17)
Equation (17) indicates that the economy’s growth rate depends negatively
on the tax rate τ, so that taxes have growth effects as well as level effects
in the Knightian model. Figure 3 illustrates these effects in more detail by
repeating its numerical exercise for the Knightian model. As before, β = 0.988
and δ = 0.1. With A = 0.165, output grows at the annual rate of 2 percent
under a constant 20 percent tax rate (King and Rebelo 1990). The ﬁgure uses
these parameter values to plot the growth rates of two Knightian economies,
one with τ = 0.20 and the other with τ = 0.25. Thus, as before, the exercise
illustrates the effects of a tax increase from 20 to 25 percent.
The ﬁgure shows that the growth rate decreases from 2 percent under the
20 percent tax rate to 1.19 percent under the 25 percent tax rate. Moreover,    
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as equations (16) and (17) imply, there is no tendency for the growth rates of
the two economies to converge; the growth rate falls permanently in response
to higher taxes. Once again, therefore, the results demonstrate that tax policies
have both level and growth effects in the Knightian model.
3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF TAXATION AND GROWTH
Although Figure 3 illustrates that the Solow and Knightian models have differ-
ent implications for the effects of taxation on long-run growth, this difference
may seem to be just a technical matter at ﬁrst. After all, the tax increase in
the Solow model does not permanently decrease growth as in the Knightian
model, but it does result in slower growth for more than two decades. When
expressed in terms of the level rather than the growth rate of output, however,
the difference is enormous. In the Solow model, the increase in the tax rate
from 20 to 25 percent decreases the level of output by 3.17 percent over 40
years. In the Knightian model, the same tax increase reduces the level of output
by 27.5 percent over 40 years.
Policymakers in the United States have recently called for increases in mar-
ginal tax rates, which they argue will help to close the federal budget deﬁcit
without signiﬁcant losses in output. Others disagree, claiming that higher taxes
inevitably lead to slower growth. As the results of the previous sections show,
competing economic theories lend support to both sides in this debate. On the
one hand, the Solow model describes an environment in which tax rates do not
affect long-run growth; on the other, the Knightian model conﬁrms the view
that higher taxes do hinder growth.
Thus, the next step in applying the theories to understand the U.S. economy
is to determine empirically whether or not changes in tax rates actually translate
into changes in long-run growth. If taxes do not inﬂuence long-run growth, then
the Solow model and its policy implications should be taken seriously. If taxes
do help determine long-run growth, however, then the Knightian model and its
implications are to be preferred.
Figure 4 plots the growth rate of real per-capita GDP (taken from the
Economic Report of the President 1993) along with Barro and Sahasakul’s
(1986) tax rate series (updated to run through 1989) for the United States. The
graph suggests that there has been a negative relationship between growth and
taxes over the postwar period. In fact, a simple regression of the growth rate
on the tax rate yields a negative coefﬁcient that is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level. Cebula and Scott (1992) use quarterly series from 1957
through 1984 to regress growth in real per-capita GDP on various measures of
ﬁscal policy, including the top personal income tax rate. They also ﬁnd that
changes in taxes have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on growth.
A problem with using these results to discriminate between the Solow and
Knightian growth models arises because even in the Solow model, changes   
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Figure 4 Growth and Tax Rates in the U.S. Economy






















in tax rates affect growth in the short run. As Figure 3 reveals, it is only in
the long run that taxes inﬂuence growth in the Knightian model but not in
the Solow model. Thus, the negative short-run correlation between taxes and
growth that appears in Figure 4 is consistent with the implications of both
models. Likewise, since Cebula and Scott do not distinguish between short-run
and long-run changes in growth, their results cannot be interpreted as decisive
evidence against the Solow model either.
Kocherlakota and Yi (1993) recognize the problem of distinguishing be-
tween short-run and long-run changes in growth and sidestep this problem
by taking a slightly different approach to test the Solow model against the
Knightian theory. They note that in addition to having distinct implications for
the effects of taxes on the growth rate of output, the two models have different
predictions for the effects of taxes on the level of output. Speciﬁcally, the
Solow model predicts that temporary changes in tax rates have only temporary
effects on the level of output. The Knightian model, in contrast, predicts that
temporary changes in taxes permanently affect the level of output.  
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Kocherlakota and Yi assume that all changes in U.S. tax rates, 1917–1983,
are temporary ones, and they use a statistical model that distinguishes between
temporary and permanent changes in the level of real GNP. Their estimate
indicates that temporary increases in tax rates have translated into permanent
decreases in the level of output; this result supports the Knightian model. On
the other hand, the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that
the Solow model may be more realistic. Overall, Kocherlakota and Yi’s results
may simply indicate that even with 65 years of data and with the most powerful
statistical techniques, it is very difﬁcult to extract much information about the
determinants of long-run growth from the U.S. time series.
Other researchers circumvent the problem of distinguishing between short-
run and long-run changes in growth by using international cross-sectional data
rather than time series data. With cross-sectional data, growth rates within
each country can be averaged over extended periods of time in order to smooth
out short-run ﬂuctuations and thereby identify long-run trends. In addition, by
drawing on the experiences of many different countries, cross-sectional data
bring more information to bear on the question of whether tax rates affect
long-run growth. On the other hand, compared to time series studies, those that
use cross-sectional data must make the additional assumption that the same
mechanisms through which taxes inﬂuence aggregate activity in the United
States operate in the other countries as well, so that conclusions that apply
internationally also hold for the United States.
Existing cross-sectional studies differ in that some use the average tax
rate, the ratio of total tax receipts to national income, while others use the
marginal tax rate, the additional taxes paid when income rises incrementally,
to estimate the effects of taxes on growth. In both of the theoretical models
presented above, the simple ﬂat-rate tax is such that the average and marginal
tax rates coincide. In reality, however, tax rates differ with the source and level
of income, so that average and marginal tax rates diverge. Since economic
decisions depend on the marginal tax rate, this measure is more appropriate
for investigating the effects of taxes on growth. Data on marginal tax rates are
often unavailable, however; average tax rates must then serve as a proxy.
Marsden (1983) takes data from 20 countries, 1970–1979. He organizes
these countries into ten pairs; each pair consists of countries with similar levels
of per-capita income but different average tax rates. In each pair, he ﬁnds that
the country with the lower tax rate has a higher rate of real GDP growth. As
a matter of fact, all of the ten low-tax countries have higher growth rates than
any of the high-tax countries. This pattern also appears in Marsden’s regression
results, which show that average tax rates have a signiﬁcantly negative effect
on growth across countries.
In Reynolds’ (1985) sample, industrial countries with high average tax
rates, including Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, grew at an average
rate of 1.7 percent between 1976 and 1983. In contrast, those with low average   
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tax rates, such as the United States, Portugal, and Japan, averaged 4.1 percent
growth. About the effects of marginal tax rates, Reynolds notes:
Supply-side tax theory would predict that economic performance in Ontario,
Canada, with a top tax rate of 51 percent, would be superior to that of Quebec,
with its 60 percent rate. It would predict that development in Puerto Rico,
with a top tax rate of 68 percent, would fall behind that of any U.S. state.
It would predict that Australia would outperform New Zealand, that Cyprus
would outperform Greece, that the state of New Jersey would grow faster than
New York, and so on. All of these predictions are correct. (P. 557)
Among developing countries, Reynolds ﬁnds that those with the highest mar-
ginal tax rates have economies that contracted by 1.4 percent annually, 1979–
1983. Those with the lowest marginal tax rates, on the other hand, have
economies that grew by 4.9 percent annually.
Skinner (1987) uses cross-sectional data from 31 sub-Saharan African
countries, 1965–1982. His regression equation shows that the average tax rate
has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on growth.
Average tax rates and growth turn out to be positively correlated in
Rabushka’s (1987) sample of 49 developing economies, 1960–1982. Rabushka
interprets this ﬁnding as evidence that governments in more prosperous coun-
tries are able to levy more taxes than those in slower-growing nations, rather
than as evidence that higher taxes lead to faster growth. Unlike average tax
rates, he notes, marginal tax rates are negatively correlated with growth. The
country with the lowest marginal tax rate, Hong Kong, has one of the highest
growth rates in the sample, averaging 7 percent annually. A group of countries
with the highest marginal tax rates, in contrast, grew at the average annual rate
of only 1.9 percent.
Most recently, Martin and Fardmanesh (1990) and Engen and Skinner
(1992) estimate cross-sectional regression equations and ﬁnd that average tax
rates are signiﬁcantly and negatively related to growth in real income per capita.
Martin and Fardmanesh’s sample includes data from 76 countries, 1972–1981;
Engen and Skinner’s consists of data from 107 countries, 1970–1985.
Thus, many cross-sectional studies appear to support the hypothesis that
tax rates inﬂuence long-run growth and thereby point to the Knightian model
as the more accurate description of the U.S. economy. Only three of these
studies, however, use more than ten years’ worth of data. The others suffer
from the same problem as Cebula and Scott’s: by averaging data over a brief
time interval, they may not adequately distinguish between short-run and long-
run variation in growth. In addition, there are still other cross-country studies
that lend support to the Solow model by indicating that changes in tax rates do
not affect the long-run growth rate of output.
Using a sample of 63 countries, 1970–1979, Koester and Kormendi (1989)
begin by noting that both average and marginal tax rates appear to be negatively  
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associated with growth. They go on to point out, however, that the level of GDP
is negatively related to growth, suggesting that smaller countries grow faster
than more developed ones. They note, in addition, that average tax rates are
positively correlated with the level of GDP; like Rabushka, they suggest that
this correlation indicates that more afﬂuent countries have governments that
levy more taxes. Together, these last two correlations raise the possibility that
earlier studies may have mistakenly concluded that changes in tax rates have
long-run effects on growth, since the negative correlation between taxes and
growth may simply reﬂect the fact that for independent reasons, both tax rates
and growth rates are related to the level of income.
To allow for this possibility, Koester and Kormendi add the level of GDP
to their growth regressions; by holding the level of income constant, they focus
on the direct link between taxes and growth. While the coefﬁcients on both
average and marginal tax rates are still negative in the expanded regressions,
neither is statistically signiﬁcant. Garrison and Lee (1992) ﬁnd that these results
continue to hold when the data set is extended through 1984. Thus, these studies
suggest that changes in tax rates do not have important growth effects.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) calculate marginal tax rates for 32 countries
in 1984. They regress the growth rate of per-capita consumption from 1980
through 1988 on the marginal tax rate as well as the level of per-capita GDP
(following Koester and Kormendi) and measures of two other variables, ed-
ucational attainment and political instability, that may explain cross-country
differences in growth rates. Like Koester and Kormendi, Easterly and Rebelo
obtain a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on the marginal tax
rate. Thus, their results also appear to support the Solow model.
Easterly and Rebelo note, however, that they cannot reject the hypothesis
that all of their regressors are jointly insigniﬁcant. Like Kocherlakota and Yi’s
time series results, therefore, Easterly and Rebelo’s cross-country results may
simply indicate that there is insufﬁcient information about the determinants of
growth in their sample.
Thus, a review of the literature reveals that no strong conclusions can yet be
reached as to which model, Solow’s exogenous growth model or the Knightian
endogenous growth model, is more appropriate for studying the effects of taxa-
tion on growth in the U.S. economy. A number of papers present evidence that
tax rates do affect long-run growth, but others ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship.
The literature points to several problems that need to be overcome in fu-
ture empirical work. Time series studies must effectively discriminate between
short-run and long-run changes in growth, for it is only long-run changes
that distinguish the competing models. Cross-sectional studies must distin-
guish between average and marginal tax rates, since marginal tax rates most
directly affect economic decisions but are frequently difﬁcult to measure. Cross-
sectional studies must also address the possibility, ﬁrst raised by Koester and
Kormendi, that simple correlations may not reﬂect the direct effects of taxation    
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on growth. Finally, Easterly and Rebelo’s results suggest that efforts to collect
tax and growth rate data from a wider sample of countries than has been
previously considered might prove useful in sharpening the statistical results.
The massive federal budget deﬁcit in the United States makes it likely that
policymakers will continue to advocate signiﬁcant tax increases in the years
ahead. Since the Solow and Knightian models offer such different predictions
for the effects of these tax increases on output, the empirical relationship be-
tween taxation and growth remains an important unsettled issue for future
research.
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